How to Read Treasury's Foreign Exchange Report — Three Criteria, the Monitoring List and Estimated Intervention

As of 10 November 2026, 00:39 KST (retrieved by this page at that time); latest listed on the agency page at retrieval: the July 2026 Report to Congress, Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of International Affairs. Cover date: July 2026 (no day given). Review period: the four quarters through December 2025, plus later developments where data are available. Primary source: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/July-2026-FX-Report.pdf^[1][3]

Comparison basis: Table 1 figures are trailing four-quarter values, rounded to one decimal for shares of GDP and to whole USD billions for balances; text figures may be rounded differently. The previous report covered the four quarters through June 2025, so the two windows share the first half of 2025, and the changes in the previous-report column are not half-year changes. Intervention figures for economies that do not publish them are Treasury estimates or amounts conveyed to Treasury: "In economies where foreign exchange interventions are not published, Treasury uses estimates of net purchases of foreign currency as a proxy for intervention." "To the extent the assumptions made do not reflect the true composition of reserves, estimates may overstate or understate intervention."^[1][2]

In three lines

1. No major trading partner met all three 2015 Act criteria, and none engaged in conduct described in Section 3004 of the 1988 Act, over the four quarters through December 2025 (Executive Summary).
2. The Monitoring List has the same 10 economies as in January 2026; Thailand, Singapore and Switzerland met 1 criterion each.
3. Of the 20 partners in Table 1, the largest bilateral surpluses with the U.S. were Mexico (USD 189 bn), Vietnam (177) and China (169).^[1]

Two laws, two tests. "Under the 1988 Act, the Secretary of the Treasury must provide semiannual reports to Congress on international economic and exchange rate policy." "Because the standards in the 1988 Act and the 2015 Act are distinct, a trading partner could be found to meet the standards identified in one of the statutes without necessarily being found to meet the standards identified in the other." "In this Report, Treasury concludes that no major trading partner of the United States engaged in conduct of the kind described in Section 3004 of the 1988 Act during the official Report period."^[1]

The three 2015 Act criteria. Treasury's thresholds are a bilateral goods and services surplus with the United States of at least USD 15 billion, a current account surplus of at least 3% of GDP, and persistent one-sided intervention: "Treasury assesses net purchases of foreign currency, conducted repeatedly, in at least 8 out of 12 months, totaling at least 2% of an economy's GDP, to be persistent, one-sided intervention." Footnote 3 adds: "Notably, this quantitative threshold is sufficient to meet the criterion." "Other patterns of intervention, with lesser amounts or less frequent interventions, might also meet the criterion depending on the circumstances of the intervention." Meeting all three triggers enhanced analysis: "In this Report, Treasury finds that no major trading partner met all three criteria under the 2015 Act during the four quarters ending December 2025, such that no major trading partner requires enhanced analysis."^[1]

Monitoring List. An economy meeting two of the three criteria is placed on the list and stays for at least two consecutive Reports; Treasury also says it will add and retain a major partner with a large and disproportionate share of the U.S. trade deficit even if it meets fewer criteria. "In this Report, the Monitoring List comprises China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland." "All economies were on the Monitoring List in the January 2026 Report." "In this Report, Thailand, Singapore, and Switzerland met one criterion in the 2015 legislation and will be removed from the Monitoring List if they meet fewer than two criteria in the next reporting period." The January 2026 Report said: "All except Thailand were on the Monitoring List in the June 2025 Report."^[1][2]

Coverage. "Treasury reviews developments in the 20 largest trading partners of the United States over the period of review." "These economies accounted for about 78% of U.S. trade in goods and services over the four quarters through December 2025." The Euro Area appears in Tables 1 and 2 as a memo row alongside its members Germany, France, Italy, Ireland and the Netherlands.^[1]

Stated counts and Table 1 counts. The July 2026 text says: "Highlighted in red in column 3 of Table 1 are the 15 major trading partners that have a bilateral surplus that met this threshold for the four quarters through December 2025." "Highlighted in red in column 2a of Table 1 are the eleven economies that met this threshold over the four quarters through December 2025." In Table 1 as rendered from page 5 of the July 2026 PDF, red figures appear in column 3 for 14 of the 20 partner rows plus the Euro Area memo row, and in column 2a for 10 partner rows; the values give the same counts (14 partners of at least USD 15 billion, 10 of at least 3% of GDP). In the January 2026 Table 1 the partner counts are 15 and 11, matching that report's text. The July 2026 text and table cannot be reconciled, and the reason is not established.^[1][2]

China's reverse repos: flow then stock. The January 2026 Report said: "Banks' FX reverse repos surged to $289 billion in the four quarters through June 2025, compared to $75 billion over the previous four quarters." The July 2026 Report says reverse repos rose to USD 54 billion from USD 25 billion and explains in footnote 16: "A previous iteration of this Report treated this series as a flow rather than stock, which inadvertently inflated banks' reverse repo activities." "The current Report correctly characterizes the scale of these activities using end-of-period stock data." The two figures are different measures, and the later report states the change of method.^[1][2]

China's two intervention proxies. Table 1 gives China's net purchases as a range, -0.5 to 1.7% of GDP (USD -105 to 323 billion), and its footnote says: "Based on the PBOC's foreign exchange assets data, intervention was not persistent." "Based on net foreign exchange settlements data, intervention was persistent." Table 1 records China as not meeting the intervention criterion. On the current account, Table 1 uses balance of payments data (3.8% of GDP), and the footnote adds: "Using customs data, China's current account surplus would be 4.4% of GDP."^[1]

Same item, two printed values. Singapore's net purchases were 3.1% of GDP in the January 2026 Table 1 and 3.2% (USD 17.7 billion) in its text; Taiwan's current account was 19.5% of GDP in the July 2026 Table 1 and 19.6% in its text. Rounding of the underlying data may explain these gaps; the cause is not established.^[1][2]

The FY 2025 federal deficit. The January 2026 Report gives a deficit of USD 1.78 trillion, 5.8% of GDP, with outlays up USD 275 billion to USD 7.00 trillion, and elsewhere says: "Progress is being made: the federal deficit in fiscal year 2025 was equal to 5.9% of GDP, a decrease from 6.3% of GDP in 2024." The July 2026 Report gives USD 1.77 trillion, 5.8% of GDP, with outlays up USD 276 billion to USD 7.01 trillion. The differences between the two reports and within the January report are not established.^[1][2]

Singapore. Treasury estimates net sales of foreign currency of USD 4 billion (0.6% of GDP) over the four quarters through December 2025, after net purchases of USD 17.7 billion in the January 2026 window and USD 29 billion (5.3% of GDP) in the four quarters of 2024 (January 2026 text). Singapore met only the current account criterion in July 2026.^[1][2]

Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Japan. "Korean authorities reported net sales of foreign exchange reserves of $28.0 billion in 2025, approximately 1.5% of GDP, $22.5 billion of which was in the fourth quarter." "Thai authorities reported net purchases in 2025 of $10 billion, which represented roughly 1.8% of GDP." Vietnam's authorities conveyed net sales of 0.2% of GDP, about USD 1 billion. "Japan did not intervene in foreign exchange markets during the Report period and remains exceptionally transparent about its intervention activity, publishing monthly intervention in aggregate and detailed daily intervention once a quarter."^[1]

Switzerland and Taiwan. "Switzerland's goods and services trade surplus with the United States decreased to $2 billion over the four quarters through December 2025 from $9 billion in 2024." Table 1 shows Swiss net purchases of 0.6% of GDP (USD 6 billion, column 1b) with Yes in column 1c, net purchases in at least 8 of 12 months, so the amount is below the 2% quantitative benchmark; Taiwan's are 0.8% of GDP (USD 8 billion) with No in column 1c.^[1]

Reserves and the dollar. "Global foreign currency reserves reached $13.1 trillion by December 2025, rising by $799 billion since December 2024." "The nominal trade-weighted dollar weakened 7.5% over the four quarters through December 2025, depreciating against advanced economy currencies by 8.4% and against emerging market economy currencies by 6.6%." The January 2026 Report said: "The nominal trade-weighted dollar weakened 3.8% over the four quarters through June 2025, depreciating against advanced economy currencies by 6.7% and emerging market economy currencies by 1.0%." The two windows overlap, so the two declines are not additive.^[1][2]

Dates kept apart. July 2026 Report: cover July 2026, review period the four quarters through December 2025. January 2026 Report: cover January 2026, review period the four quarters through June 2025. The Treasury page lists the July 2026 Report first and the January 2026 and June 2025 Reports as past reports; it shows no publication day for either.^[1][2][3]

Next release. The Treasury page says: "The Treasury Department's semiannual Report to Congress reviews developments in international economic and exchange rate policies across the United States' major trading partners." Neither the July 2026 Report nor the page gives a date for the next report, so its release date is not established.^[1][3]